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ABSTRACT 
This article presents a new signcryption scheme which is based on the Schnorr digital signature 
algorithm. The new scheme represents my personal contribution to signcryption area. I have been 
implemented the algorithm in a program and here are provided the steps of the algorithm, the results and 
some examples. The paper also contains the presentation of the original Signcryption scheme, based on 
ElGamal digital signature and discusses the practical applications of Signcryption in real life. 
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The article is structured in seven parts, as follows. Signcryption and its properties 
definitions are contained in the first part. Also here, in introduction, are presented the practical 
applications of Signcryption in real life.  In the second part is exposed the original signcryption 
primitive introduced by Youliang Zheng, which combines public key encryption and a 
derivation of ElGamal digital signature algorithm. Part three contains the presentation of the 
new sygncryption scheme, Schnorr Signcryption, as a result of the combination of public key 
encryption and Schnorr digital signature algorithm. The step-by-step implementation of the 
Schnorr Signcryption scheme in a source code program is reflected in the fourth part. Strating 
with the fifth part begins the analyze of the security models on Schnorr Signcryption. The two-
users security model is presented in the sixth part and multi-user security model is presented in 
the seventh part. In each of this models there is exposed another classification for security, the 
insider security and the outsider security.    
1. INTRODUCTION 
Signcryption is the primitive that has been proposed by Youliang Zheng in 1997 and 
combines public key encryption with digital signature in a single logical step, obtaining 
a less cost for both communication and computation [1]. 
Data confidentiality and data integrity are two of the most important functions of 
modern cryptography. Confidentiality can be achieved using encryption algorithms or 
ciphers, whereas integrity can be provided by the use of authentication techniques. 
Encryption algorithms fall into one of two broad groups: private key encryption and 
public key encryption. Likewise, authentication techniques can be categorized by 
private key authentication algorithms and public key digital signatures. 
While both private key encryption and private key authentication admit very fast 
computation with minimal message expansion, public key encryption and digital 
signatures generally require heavy computation, such as exponentiations involving very 
large integers, together with message expansion proportional to security parameters 
(such as the size of a large composite integer or the size of a large finite field). 
Signcryption has the intention that the primitive should satisfy “Cost(Signature & Encryption) 
<< Cost(Signature) + Cost(Encryption).” This inequality can be interpreted in a number of 
ways: 
• A signcryption scheme should be more computationally efficient than a native combination of 
public-key encryption and digital signatures. 
• A signcryption scheme should produce a signcryption “ciphertext” which is shorter than a 
naive combination of a public-key encryption ciphertext and a digital signature. 
• A signcryption scheme should provide greater security guarantees and/or greater functionality 
than a native combination of public-key encryption and digital signatures [1]. 
More recently, the significance of signcryption in real-world applications has gained 
recognition by experts in data security. Since 2007, a technical committee within the 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27) has been developing an 
international standard for signcryption techniques [7]. 
The shared secret key between the parties makes possible an unlimited number of 
applications. Among these applications, one can first think of the following three: 
• secure and authenticated key establishment, 
• secure multicasting, and 
• authenticated key recovery. 
      A number of signcryption-based security protocols have been proposed for aforementioned 
networks and similar environments. These include: 
• secure ATM networks, 
• secure routing in mobile ad hoc networks, 
• secure voice over IP (VoIP) solutions, 
• encrypted email authentication by firewalls, 
• secure message transmission by proxy, and 
• secure message transmission by proxy, and 
• mobile grid web services. 
The mobile ad hoc networks get subjected to security threats like other wireless networks. 
But due to their peer to peer approach and absence of infrastructural resources the mobile ad hoc 
networks cannot use strong cryptographic mechanisms as used by their other wireless 
counterparts. This led to the development of trust based methods as security solutions wherein a 
trusted node is relaxed from security checks when the trust value reaches to a particular limit. 
The trust methods are prone to security risks but have found their acceptance due to efficiency 
over computationally expensive and time consuming cryptographic methods. The major 
problem with the trust methods is the period during which trust is growing and is yet to reach 
the requisite threshold [10]. 
       There are also various applications of signcryption in electronic commerce, where its 
security properties are very useful. Analyzing this security scheme from an application-oriented 
point of view, can be observed that a great amount of electronic commerce can take advantage 
of signcryption to provide efficient security solutions in the following areas: 
• electronic payment, 
• electronic toll collection system, 
• authenticated and secured transactions with smart cards, etc. 
A related new public key primitive called Attribute-based encryption (ABE) attracted 
much attention recently. ABE has significant advantage over the traditional PKC 
primitives as it achieves flexible one-to-many encryption instead of one-to-one. ABE is 
envisioned an important tool for addressing the problem of secure and fine-grained data 
sharing and access control [9]. 
My personal contribution to the article is represented by the Schnorr Signcryption scheme 
which has been introduced here. Schnorr Signcryption scheme is made up of a combination 
between a public key encryption scheme and a digital signature scheme. On the base of the 
scheme that I present here stands the Schnorr digital signature. A Schnorr signature is a digital 
signature produced by the Schnorr signature algorithm. Its security is based on the intractability 
of certain discrete logarithm problems. It is considered the simplest digital signature scheme to 
be provably secure in a random oracle model. It is efficient and generates short signatures. 
 
A signcryption scheme typically consists of five algorithms, Setup, KeyGenS, KeyGenR, 
Signcrypt, Unsigncrypt: 
• Setup - takes as input a security parameter 1^ k and outputs any common 
parameters param required by the signcryption schemes. This may include the 
security parameter 1^ k , the description of a group G and a generator g for that group, 
choices for hash functions or symmetric encryption schemes, etc. 
• Key Generation S(Gen) - generates a pair of keys for the sender 
• Key Generation R(Gen) - generates a pair of keys for the receiver 
• Signcryption (SC) - is a probabilistic algorithm 
• Unsigncryption (USC) - is a deterministic algorithm. 
A signcryption scheme is a combination between a public key encryption algorithm and a 
digital signature scheme. 
A public key encryption scheme consists of three polynomial-time algorithms (EncKeyGen, 
Encrypt, Decrypt). 
EncKeyGen - Key generation is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a security 
parameter 1^ k and outputs a key pair (skenc, pkenc), written (skenc, 
pkenc)R←EncKeyGen(1^k ). The public encryption key pkenc is widely distributed, while the 
private decryption key skenc should be kept secret. The public key defines a message m ∈ M 
and a ciphertext ∈ C. 
Encrypt - Encryption is a probabilistic algorithm that takes a message m ∈ M and the 
public key pkenc as input and outputs a ciphertext C ∈ C, written C ←Encrypt(pkenc,m) 
Decrypt  - Decryption is a deterministic algorithm that takes a ciphertext C ∈ C and the 
private key skenc as input and outputs either a message m ∈ ⊥M or the failure symbol , written 
m ← Decrypt(skenc,C). 
2. ELGAMAL SIGNCRYPTION 
ElGamal signcryption is the original signcryption scheme that has been introduced by 
Youliang Zheng in 1997. It is created on a derivation of ElGamal digital signature standard, 
combined with a public key encryption scheme. 
 
Based on discrete algorithm problem, Signcryption cost is: 
58% less in average computation time 
70% less in message expansion 
Here is the detailed presentation of the fifth algorithms that make up the ElGamal signcryption 
scheme. 
1)Setup 
Signcryption parameters: 
p = a large prime number, public to all  
q = a large prime factor of p-1, public to all 
g = an integer with order q modulo p, in [1,… , p-1], public to all 
hash = a one-way hash function 
KH = a keyed one-way hash function = KHk(m) = hash(k, m) 
(E, D) = the algorithms which are used for encryption and decryption of a private key cipher. 
Alice sends a message to Bob. 
2)KeyGen sender 
Alice has the pair of keys (Xa, Ya): 
Xa = Alice’s private key, chosen randomly from [1, .., q-1] 
Ya = Alice’s public key =  mod p 
3)KeyGen receiver 
Bob has the pair of keys(Xb, Yb): 
Xb = Bob’s private key, chosen randomly from [1, .., q-1] 
Yb = Bob’s public key =  mod p. 
4)Signcryption 
In order to signcrypt a message m to Bob, Alice has to accomplish the following operations: 
Calculate  
 
Split k in k1 and k2 of appropriate length. 
Calculate r = KHk2(m) = hash(h2, m) 
Calculate s = x/(r+Xa) mod q, if SDSS1 is used 
Calculate s = x/(1+Xa · r) mod q, if SDSS2 is used 
Calculate c = Ek1(m) = the encryption of the message m with the key k1. 
Alice sends to Bob the values (r, s, c). 
5)Unsigncryption 
In order to unsigncrypt a message from Alice, Bob has to accomplish the following 
operations: 
Calculate k using r, s, g, p, Ya and Xb 
, if is used SDSS1 
, if is used SDSS2 
Split k in k1 and k2 of appropriate length. 
Calculate m using the decryption algorithm m = Dk1(c). 
Accept m as a valid message only if KHk2(m) = r. 
 
Using the two schemes SDSS1 and SDSS2, two signcryption schemes have been created, 
SCS1 and SCS2, respectively. The two signcryption schemes share the same communication 
overhead, (|hash(*)| + |q|). SCS1 involves one less modular multiplication in signcryption then 
SCS2, both have a similar computational cost for unsigncryption [1]. 
 
3. SCHNORR SIGNCRYPTION 
A Schnorr signature is a digital signature produced by the Schnorr signature algorithm. Its 
security is based on the intractability of certain discrete logarithm problems. It is considered the 
simplest digital signature scheme to be provably secure in a random oracle model [3]. 
Choosing parameters 
All users of the signature scheme agree on a group G with generator g of prime order q in 
which the discrete log problem is hard. 
Key generation 
• Choose a private signing key x. 
• The public verification key is y = gx. 
Signing 
To sign a message M: 
• Choose a random k. 
• Let r = gk 
• Let e = H(M | | r), where || denotes concatenation and r is represented as a bit string. H is 
a cryptographic hash function . 
• Let s = (k − xe). 
The signature is the pair (s,e). 
Verifying 
• Let rv = gsye 
• Let ev = H(M | | rv) 
If ev = e then the signature is verified. 
Demonstration of correctness 
It can be observed that ev = e if the signed message equals the verified message: 
rv = gsye = gk − xegxe = gk = r, and hence ev = H(M | | rv) = H(M | | r) = e. 
It has been considered that k < q and the assumption that the hash function is collision-resistant. 
Public elements: G, g, q, y, s, e, r.  
Private elements: k, x. [4] 
 
A Schnorr Signcryption scheme is based on Schnorr digital signature algorithm. 
Here is the detailed presentation of the fifth algorithms that make up the Schnorr signcryption 
scheme. 
1)Setup 
Schnorr Signcryption parameters: 
p = a large prime number, public to all  
q = a large prime factor of p-1, public to all 
g = an integer with order q modulo p, in [1,… , p-1], public to all 
hash = a one-way hash function 
KH = a keyed one-way hash function = KHk(m) = hash(k, m) 
(E, D) = the algorithms which are used for encryption and decryption of a private key cipher. 
Alice sends a message to Bob. 
2)KeyGen sender 
Alice has the pair of keys (Xa, Ya): 
Xa = Alice’s private key, chosen randomly from [1, .., q-1] 
Ya = Alice’s public key = mod p 
3)KeyGen receiver 
Bob has the pair of keys(Xb, Yb): 
Xb = Bob’s private key, chosen randomly from [1, .., q-1] 
Yb = Bob’s public key = mod p. 
4)Signcryption 
In order to signcrypt a message m to Bob, Alice has to accomplish the following operations: 
Calculate  
 
Split k in k1 and k2 of appropriate length. 
Calculate r = KHk2(m) = hash(h2, m) 
Calculate s = x + (r * Xa) mod q 
Calculate c = Ek1(m) = the encryption of the message m with the key k1. 
Alice sends to Bob the values (r, s, c). 
5)Unsigncryption 
In order to unsigncrypt a message from Alice, Bob has to accomplish the following operations: 
Calculate k using r, s, g, p, Ya and Xb 
 
Split k in k1 and k2 of appropriate length. 
Calculate m using the decryption algorithm m = Dk1(c). 
Accept m as a valid message only if KHk2(m) = r. 
 
Analyzing the two presented signcryption schemes, it can be observed that in case of Shnorr 
signcryption the computation of s, which is s = x + (r * Xa) mod q, is less consuming comparing 
with the formula used in ElGamal algorithm,  where s is s = x/(r+Xa) mod q.  
Another difference is on the level of unsigncryption step as k is computing differently, using 
this formula for Schnorr and this formula for ElGamal 
k= . 
  
4. IMPLEMENTATION OF SCHNORR SIGNCRYPTION SCHEME 
I created a source code program that verifies my algorithm.  Executing this program I could 
generate examples. The step-by-step implementation of the algorithm is as follows:  
1)Calculate Ya and Yb 
double powA = Math.Pow(g, xA); 
int pow_intA = Convert.ToInt32(powA); 
int invA = modInverse(pow_intA, p); 
 
2)Calculate k 
int yB = Convert.ToInt32(textBox11.Text); 
int x = Convert.ToInt32(textBox18.Text); 
int p = Convert.ToInt32(textBox4.Text); 
string cheie = (BigInteger.ModPow(yB, x, p)).ToString(); 
 
3)Calculate hash(k) 
 string HashDeCheie = _calculateHash(cheie); 
 textBox13.Text = HashDeCheie; 
 
4)Split k in two keys k1 and k2 with the same lenght 
byte[] k = Convert.FromBase64String(textBox13.Text);  
byte[] k1 = new byte[k.Length/2]; 
byte[] k2 = new byte[k.Length - k.Length / 2]; 
Buffer.BlockCopy(k, 0, k1, 0, k.Length/2);             
Buffer.BlockCopy(k, k.Length / 2, k2, 0, k.Length - k.Length / 2);  
byte[] test = new byte[k.Length]; 
k1.CopyTo(test, 0); 
k2.CopyTo(test, k1.Length); 
 
5)Calculate r using k2;  r = hash (k2, m) 
BigInteger p = BigInteger.Parse(textBox4.Text); 
System.Text.ASCIIEncoding encoding = new System.Text.ASCIIEncoding(); 
byte[] keyByte = encoding.GetBytes(key); 
HMACSHA1 hmacsha1 = new HMACSHA1(keyByte); 
byte[] messageBytes =encoding.GetBytes(message); 
byte[] hashmessage = hmacsha1.ComputeHash(messageBytes); 
 
6)Calculate r using k2; transform the value obtained from hash in base 10 
textBox19.Text = fn16to10(textBox15.Text).ToIntString(); 
 
7)Calculate the modulo p of the number obtained in base 10 
BigInteger nr=BigInteger.Parse(textBox19.Text); 
BigInteger p = BigInteger.Parse(textBox4.Text); 
BigInteger  rest = 0; 
BigInteger.DivRem(nr, p, out rest);  
 
8)Calculate s 
BigInteger q = Convert.ToInt32(textBox5.Text); 
BigInteger  r = Convert.ToInt32(textBox20.Text); 
BigInteger XA = Convert.ToInt32(textBox9.Text); 
BigInteger X = Convert.ToInt32(textBox18.Text); 
BigInteger prod = BigInteger.Multiply(r, XA); 
BigInteger sum = X + prod; 
BigInteger rest; 
BigInteger.DivRem(sum, q, out rest); 
 9)Encrypt m using the k1 
 
10)Calculate k 
BigInteger rez2 = BigInteger.Pow(rez1, XB); 
BigInteger invK = modInverseBI(rez2, p); 
 
Here is provided an example from the execution of the program on small numbers. 
Example: 
p = 23, q = 11, g = 2, X=3 
XA=4 => YA=13 
XB=5 => YB=18 
k = 13 => hash(k) = vTB6PsMp4Qos/4+4dICCPaEU+PQ= 
k1 = vTB6PsMp4Qos/w== 
k2 = j7h0gII9oRT49A== 
hash(k2, m) = E2726583242AB5CCE58AE1151DB126208F17932F 
hash(k2,m) in base 10 = 1292783042124763369608714420962730428414981280559 
(hash(k2,m) in base 10) mod p = 3 
s mod q = x+(r*Xa)  mod q = 4 
Unsigncrypt k  = 13 
 
5. SECURITY MODELS FOR SCHNORR SIGNCRYPTION 
The first attempt to produce security models for signcryption was given by Steinfeld and 
Zheng [6]. 
A family of security models for signcryption in both two-user and multi-user settings was 
presented by An [5] in their work on signcryption schemes built from black-box signature and 
encryption schemes. 
Defining the security of signcryption in the public-key setting is more involved than the 
corresponding task in the symmetric setting [8] due to the asymmetric nature of the former. The 
asymmetry of keys makes a difference in the notions of both authenticity and privacy on two 
major fronts which are addressed in this chapter. 
The first difference for Schnorr signcryption is that the security of the signcryption needs to be 
defined in the multi-user setting, where issues with users’ identities need to be addressed. On 
the other hand, authenticated encryption in the symmetric setting can be fully defined in a much 
simpler two-user setting. 
The case of Schnorr settings not only makes a difference in the multiuser and two-user settings 
but also makes a difference in the adversary’s position depending on its knowledge of the keys. 
There are two definitions for security of signcryption depending on whether the adversary is an 
“outsider” (a third party who only knows the public information) or “insider” (a legal user of the 
network, either the sender or the receiver, or someone that knows the secret key of either the 
sender or the receiver). In the first case the security model is named “outsider security” and in 
the latter “insider security”. 
 
6. TWO-USERS SECURITY MODEL 
In the symmetric setting, there is only one specific pair of users who  
(1) share a single key;  
(2) trust each other;  
(3) “know who they are”;  
(4) only care about being protected from “the rest of the world.”  
In contrast, in Schnorr signcryption setting, each user independently publishes its public keys, 
after which it can send/receive messages to/from any other user. In particular, (1) each user 
should have an explicit identity (associated with its public key); (2) each signcryption has to 
explicitly contain the (presumed) identities of the sender S and the receiver R; (3) each user 
should be protected from every other user. 
The security goal is to provide both authenticity and privacy of communicated data. In the 
symmetric setting, since the sender and the receiver share the same secret key, the only security 
model that makes sense is one in which the adversary is modeled as a third party or an outsider 
who does not know the shared secret key. For Schnorr signcryption setting, the sender and the 
receiver do not share the same secret key but each has his/her own secret key. Due to this 
asymmetry of the secret keys, the data needs to be protected not only from an outsider but also 
from an insider who is a legal user of the system (the sender or the receiver themselves or 
someone who knows either the sender’s secret key or the receiver’s secret key) [2]. 
 
 
1) Outsider Security Model 
 
The adversary A has the public information represented by the sender’s public key and the 
receiver’s public key (pkS, pkR). He also has oracle access to the functionalities of both the 
sender and the receiver. Specifically, it can mount a chosen message attack on the sender by 
asking the sender to produce a Schnorr signcryption C of an arbitrary message m. In other 
words, A has access to the signcryption oracle. Similarly, it can mount a chosen ciphertext 
attack on the receiver by giving the receiver any candidate Schnorr signcryption C and receiving 
back the message m (where m could be ⊥), which means that A has access to the 
unsigncryption oracle. A cannot by itself run either the signcryption or the unsigncryption 
oracles due to the lack of corresponding secret keys skS and skR.  
2) Insider Security Model 
 
In case of the insider security model, the attacker is given one of the private keys of the users. 
If the attacker is the receiver, he has the private key of the receiver and the signcryption scheme 
prevents a receiver from forging a signcryption ciphertext that purports to be from the sender. 
This is a necessary condition if non-repudiation is to be achieved. In the other situation, if the 
attacker is the sender, he has the private key of the sender and the signcryption scheme prevents 
a sender from deciphering a signcryption ciphertext that has previously been produced. This 
means that the Schnorr signcryption scheme protects the confidentiality of messages even if the 
sender’s private key is subsequently leaked to an attacker. 
 
7. MULTI-USER SECURITY MODEL 
A central difference between the multi-user model and the two-user models is the extra power 
of the adversary. In the multi-user model, the attacker may choose receiver (resp. sender) public 
keys when accessing the attacked users’ signcryption (resp. unsigncryption) oracles. For 
signcryption schemes that share some functionality between the signature and the encryption 
components, such as are the case for Zheng’s Signcryption scheme and Schnorr Signcryption 
scheme, the extra power of the adversary in the multi-user model may be much more 
significant, and a careful case-by-case analysis is required to establish security of such schemes 
in the multi-user model. 
As in the two-user setting, the multi-user setting also has two types of models depending on 
the identity of the attacker: an insider model and an outsider model. 
1) Outsider Security Model 
 
The outsider model assumes an attack by an entity who does not know either the sender or 
receiver’s secret keys. In the multi-user model, this confidentiality notion of signcryption is 
specially termed “indistinguishability of signcryptext against chosen ciphertext attack with 
access to ‘flexible’ signcryption/unsigncryption oracles (FSO/FUOIND- CCA2).” The 
indistinguishability of signcryptext (abbreviated by “IND”) here means that there is no 
polynomial-time adversary that can learn any information about the plaintext from the 
signcryptext except for its length. In the chosen ciphertext attack for signcryption, it is assumed 
that an adversary has access to two oracles that perform signcryption and unsigncryption. The 
oracles are flexible in the sense that the adversary can freely choose the public keys with which 
those oracles perform Schnorr signcryption and Schnorr unsigncryption. 
Let A = (A1,A2) be a two-stage adversary trying to break the confidentiality of messages 
between the (fixed) sender S and the (fixed) receiver R. 
1. The Setup algorithm is run and the resulting common parameters, denoted by param, is sent 
to any interested parties including S, R, and A1. 
2. The KeyGenS and KeyGenR algorithms are run to generate S and R’s public/private key 
pairs, denoted by (skS, pkS) and (skR, pkR), respectively. The public keys (pkS, pkR) are given 
to A1. 
3. A1 submits a series of signcryption and unsigncryption queries. Each signcryption query 
consists of a pair (pk,m) where pk is a receiver’s public key generated by A1 and m is a 
message. On receiving this, the signcryption oracle computes a signcryptext C ← 
Signcrypt(param, skS, pk,m) and returns it to A1. Each unsigncryption query consists of a pair 
(pk’,C) where pk’ denotes a sender’s public key generated by A1 at will and C is a signcryptext. 
On receiving this, the unsigncryption oracle performs unsigncryption by computing 
Unsigncrypt(param, pk’, skR,C) and returns the result to A1. 
4. A1 outputs a pair of equal-length plaintexts (m0,m1) and a state string α. On receiving this, 
the Schnorr signcryption oracle picks b ←R {0, 1} at random, computes a target signcryptext 
C∗ ←Signcrypt(param, skS, pkR,mb), and runs A2 on input (C∗ , α). 
 
5. A2 submits a number of signcryption/unsigncryption queries as A1 did in Step 3. A 
restriction here is that A2 is not allowed to query (pkS,C∗ ) to the unsigncryption oracle.  
6. A2 outputs its guess b’ ∈ {0, 1} for the value of b chosen in Step 4. A is said to win the 
game if b’ = b. 
2) Insider Security Model 
 
Unlike the outsider setting where the attacker only knows the public keys of the attacked pair 
of users S and R, the insider model deals with the setting where an attacker, knowing the secret 
key of the sender S, tries to decrypt the Schnorr signcryptexts sent by that sender. In order to 
give the attacker as much power as possible, it is provided the sender’s key pair. 
1. The Setup algorithm is run and the resulting common parameters, denoted by param, is sent 
to any interested parties including S, R, and A1. 
2. The key generation algorithm is run just once, to generate the attacked receiver’s key pair 
(skR, pkR), and pkR is given to A1. 
3. A has access to R’s unsigncryption oracle, but not to the signcryption oracle. 
4. A1 outputs an attacked sender’s key pair (skS, pkS), in addition to (m0,m1, α). The key skS 
is used to produce the challenge signcryptext C  as in the outsider model.∗  
5. A has access to R’s unsigncryption oracle, but not to the signcryption oracle. 
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